A case for justice? : reflections on the foundations and perspectives of the German arms export politics by Moltmann, Bernhard
Bernhard Moltmann
A case for justice?
Reflections on the foundations
and perspectives of the German
arms export politics
PRIF Reports No. 60
II
ã Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) 2001
Correspondence to:
PRIF  Leimenrode 29  60322 Frankfurt am Main  Germany
Telephone: +49 (0) 69 95 91 04-0  Fax: +49 (0) 69 55 84 81
Email: moltmann@hsfk.de  website: http://www.hsfk.de
Translation: Dr Diane Spiedel, Edge Translations, Manchester
ISBN: 3-933293-54-5
€ 10,–
Summary
German arms export policies have proved to be an eternally emotive issue in political and
social debate. Although the controversy does not, in the long run, illuminate, the vehe-
mence with which it is time and again conducted indicates that all is not well. In a de-
mocracy based on the rule of law, should we not be able to assume that the apparent col-
lisions between accepted norms and vested interests are governed by the law in a way that
political and administrative actions do not produce any fundamental contradictions in
terms? To meet this objective, the law must be universally valid and achievable, to ensure
the maintenance of peace under the law. In reality, a glance at the system of legal norms
and procedures that shape current German arms export politics leaves an impression of
“extraordinary complexity” and reflects “an extremely unclear and interlocked structure
of legal rulings with numerous origins” candidly admits a legal commentator.
This judgement is confirmed when these legal foundations, as they appear in their
German sources, are considered in the context of the European Union and in view of the
general global situation. Therefore, it is not surprising that the German political and ad-
ministrative handling of arms exports gets tangled in inconsistencies that feed the contro-
versy. In view of this awkwardness, the situation should be reviewed from the perspective
that maintenance of the peace nationally also demonstrates the state’s ability to maintain
peace at an international level, particularly if that state is a democracy.
Difficulties already start with the effort to define, in detail, what is meant by the phrase
“arms exports.” Currently, a distinction is drawn between the cross-border transfer of
arms, defence equipment, goods that promote war and dual-use goods. Most recently, the
term “military equipment” has been used to summarise all these different categories of
items. As a consequence, the Arms Control Law (Kriegswaffenkontrollgesetz) and the law
ruling commercial relations with other states (Law for Foreign Trade, Außenwirtschafts-
gesetz), including their detailed administrative regulations, apply. However, intervention
is repeatedly required to ensure harmony between administrative acts and the changing
parameters of political actions. This is demonstrated by the various editions of the “Prin-
ciples of Government Policy in Relation to Arms Export,” the most recent of which was
published in January 2000.
German law only applies, however, where it has not been superseded or comple-
mented by EU regulations. This is true for the treatment of dual-use goods and for the
growing consolidation of cooperation in arms manufacture within Europe. While deci-
sions about arms export issues in the context of the EU still fall under the ultimate sover-
eignty of individual states, the EU member states agreed, in 1998, to a code of conduct
concerning arms transfers. This agreement contains criteria to be applied to the decision
making process of the individual member states. Special emphasis is given to the human
rights standards, social and economic aspects of development and the regional and do-
mestic stability of the receiver states. Also, the code of conduct commits EU member
states to present a report annually on the previous year’s arms export activities to the
European parliament and requires the member states to provide each other with infor-
mation about their arms trade.
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The EU code of conduct incorporates aims, formulated by the Organisation for Secu-
rity and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) at the beginning of the nineties, that also relate
to the adjustment of export policies of Central and Eastern European states. The idea of
agreeing to a code of conduct, when legally binding arrangements do not seem possible,
also formed the basis of an agreement between the EU and the USA in December 2000,
the goal of which was the realisation of a global code of conduct. In this context, the EU
and the USA can make reference to similar initiatives of other regional alliances, in par-
ticular the Organisation of American States (OAS), the Organisation of African Unity
(OAU) and some groups of states in South Asia. All these initiates demonstrate that the
international arms trade has become part of arms control politics.
In addition to being influenced by regulations within individual states and newly
agreed political understandings, arms export politics takes into consideration informal
consultation and coordination mechanisms, which are treated as “gentlemen’s agree-
ments”. The best known of these is the 1994/5 ”Wassenar Arrangement,” which followed
the earlier Coordination Committee for Multilateral Exports Controls (COCOM). It aims
to regulate the export of conventional arms and equipment, sensitive dual-use goods and
plant. The arrangement has more than thirty participant states, including Russia and
other states that formerly belonged to the Warsaw Pact. Despite the informal nature of
this agreement, the resulting regime has a strong influence on national and European
export controls.
The legal and political situation can, thus, be summarised as consisting of a “hard”
core surrounded by “soft” regulations, instructions and procedures that together form
the basis of decisions and are open to interpretation. Decisions are often made in an in-
consistent manner, as political recommendations are influenced by conflicting economic
and technological interests, not to mention cases of political opportunism with regard to
the granting or refusal of individual arms export licences. Different levels of law, national,
international and trans-national, are entwined, often leaving legislative loopholes and
creating contradictions in terms. While lawyers might be used to dealing with different
levels of law, politicians and the public find it much more difficult to cope with the re-
sulting dilemmas. Exaggeratedly, the situation in Germany can be characterised as fol-
lows:
1. the prohibition versus the allowance of cross-border trade in defence equipment;
2. qualitative criteria for the decision making process versus lists of countries;
3. national versus international or trans-national restrictions;
4. governmental agreements versus cooperation in the private sector;
5. secrecy versus transparency.
The current state of affairs casts doubt on whether the general validity, clarity and enact-
ment of present laws can be sufficiently guaranteed. This rocks the foundations of the
legitimacy and legality of arms export politics – a situation or constellation that calls for a
fundamental examination and reorientation of arms export politics, down to its very
roots.
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The plea for a revision of the foundations of the arms export politics and for a search
for alternatives, aims to reconcile the legal norms and procedures with the political re-
quirements and central trends of the social debate, which could remedy the deficits that
can, in the long run, damage a democracy based on the rule of law. This should also in-
clude changes in the global arms market that have occurred in the meantime. This mar-
ket can be divided into different segments:
The first segment relates to the predominantly uncontrolled distribution of the means
of mass destruction, in the form of a multitude of so-called small arms. These can be
characterised as being easy to transport, easy to handle without previous knowledge, low
cost and long-lived. They are produced in many places and are available on open, grey
and black markets.
The second segment relates to the transfer of technologically advanced and very ex-
pensive weapons systems, the purchase and deployment of which is only sensible in coop-
eration with modern, highly qualified forces.
In between these two segments exists a third segment that relates to the trade of weap-
ons and defence equipment that are considered outdated by industrial states but which
still have high value as status symbols or as part of the military politics of less demanding
prospective buyers.
A German contribution to the first segment of the global arms market exists in form
of German licences, which are openly used to produce and distribute weapons in an un-
controlled way, not to mention the transfer of plant of German origin that can be used to
produce those weapons or their ammunition. Conventional legal instruments have be-
come virtually ineffective for monitoring, as this segment is becoming more and more
mixed up with cross-border criminal acts, international drugs trade and money launder-
ing. Therefore, national as well as international measures are required to put an end to
illegal deals. Also, in order to decrease demand for these weapons, it is imperative to
strengthen international criminal law, cooperation between police and customs and ini-
tiatives in development policy regarding violent conflict-zones in the Third World.
As a consequence of the increasing integration of the foreign and security policies of
the European Union, of the restructuring of the armed forces in many countries and the
increasing cooperation or even merger of European defence industries, it will not be pos-
sible to control the second and third segment except in a European context. The six most
important arms producing states in the European Union settled on a skeleton agreement
in July 2000 that creates the basic conditions for such a European endeavour. It would be
anachronistic if arms export politics continued as a remnant of national sovereignty,
rather than becoming a component of this political and economical process. It would be
consistent to restrict the transfer of weapons and defence equipment to the circle of states
that are part of these developments. Also, the norms and qualitative criteria that are valid
here should govern decisions about transfer of surplus weapons to countries that are not
part of military or security alliances. If it were possible to reconcile the procedures in-
volved in political direction setting with decisions about arms export, then the law would
no longer have to serve as workshop, repairing the faults caused by political omissions
and failures.
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Although all options so far discussed assume that some form of arms export will con-
tinue to be carried out, the alternative of living without such deals should also be consid-
ered. This would place considerable emphasis on the proclaimed aim of a democracy to
be recognised as a ‘civil power’ (Zivilmacht), including in their behaviour to other states.
However, the most important suppliers of arms are still democracies that provide arms to
the rest of the world. Without the supply of weapons and other defence equipment, the
intensity with which brute force is used in the violent conflicts in which democracies are
involved, would decrease. Thus, the costs of such a sudden change in policy need to be
weighed against the burdens imposed by the current situation. This comparison might
also reveal connections that would cast a different light on the pros and cons of arms
transfer and might even convince current advocates of arms trade. One example of such a
process is the successful campaign, 150 years ago, for the abolition of slavery. If democ-
racy, law and peace are to go hand in hand, then the rejection of arms export is a good
example to test this cause and a global advertisement for it.
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1. The arms export debate and the call for legislation
1.1. The outline of the debate
However you look at it, arms export remains an emotive issue in German political and
social debate. All might appear calm for long periods, however, a deliberate or uninten-
tional leak about the issue of another export licence for arms and defence equipment will
cause the debate to flare up and lead to the reestablishment of familiar front lines. Al-
though the exchange of views is almost routine, it is worth considering the structure of
this particular debate in more detail. Two peculiar characteristics can be observed.
Firstly, it is revealing that no party claims that the transfer of arms and defence
equipment serves to promote peace. Indeed, such a claim would contradict all the avail-
able evidence, for example, from statistical studies of the relationship between arms
shipments and the number of wars.1 As far this goes, a fundamental agreement can be
assumed. Indeed, those in favour of arms transfer give different reasons: They say, for
example, that only with the help of exports can the arms industries in Germany and
Europe ensure sufficiently high level of sales of their products. They continue that this
high level of sales is essential to maintain the defence capabilities that are required to
preserve national sovereignty and to form alliances. A different argument amounts to the
idea that arms exports are a normal part of daily economic and political life, which Ger-
many cannot abandon on moral and historical grounds, unless it wishes to relinquish a
relevant sector of foreign trade to its competitors. These competitors are said to be ready
and waiting to fill the gap Germany would create if it were to pull out of arms export,
following the motto: “If they do not supply, we will”. Other advocates of arms export
refer to the circumstances and needs of the recipients: No state could be refused the right
to do everything in its power to defend itself. They argue that the refusal of a potential
supplier amounts to an embargo or a negative intervention. The shipment of arms is said
to contribute to stability in conflict zones – a perception that might have guided the ex-
tensive German deliveries to Greece and Turkey. In the case of Israel, arms exports are to
be seen as proof that Germany supports a well equipped, if not over-equipped, but trou-
bled partner state. Some voices persistently, though not quite as loudly, point out that
arms exports help to secure jobs, particularly in economically weak areas and in endan-
gered sectors of economy, such as the shipbuilding industry. Trade unions and workers
representatives form, together with arms manufactures, a forceful lobby that aims to put
political decision makers under pressure and to influence public opinion. This lobby
finds support from some federal states, for example Bavaria.
The opponents of arms export are familiar with all these arguments and have, over
many years, tried to refute them. They question whether a state’s sovereignty still depends
on the splendour of its armed forces and defence capabilities. Alternatively, a state’s in-
1 Conclusion by Cassidy B. Craft, Weapons for Peace, Weapons for War. The Effects of Arms Transfers
on War Outbreak. Involvement and Outcome, New York (Routledge), 1999.
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ternational standing may depend on other factors, such as its economic productivity, the
efficiency of its administration, the foresightedness of its education system and – above all
– whether there is a sound consensus of norms and values in society and politics. A state’s
right to defend itself may be beyond doubt and is enshrined in the UN charter, however,
although they repeatedly justify their military actions with this right of self-defence, it is
extremely doubtful that arms alone can ensure the protection of states and societies, par-
ticularly as, in many parts of the world, new paths have been trodden in the maintenance
of security and of the well being of the people. The argument for increased regional sta-
bility through arms exports is countered by reference to regional arms races triggered by
arms export and to the dangers of escalation. Opponents point to crisis areas, mainly in
the Middle and Far East but also in Southeast Asia, where weapons of German origin
have played a significant role. The argument that arms exports secure jobs is to some
extent plausible, at least with reference to isolated sites and companies. However, the
argument does not stand up in the light of long-term economic and employment trends,
as defence industries are anyway always subject to strong fluctuations in the market for
their products. These industries will only be able to secure their existence if, instead of
focusing their efforts on defence equipment alone, they aim for a diversification of their
product range. If one of them runs into difficulties, a fate that has in fact befallen many
once renowned German arms manufactures, then business competence and foresight
should be tested, instead of trying to turn employees into victims and seeking refuge in
the export business.
The arguments of the advocates of arms exports aside, opponents refer to different
problem areas, particularly concerning arms deliveries to states outside the industrial
world. In this context, they ask whether it would make more sense to limit defensive ef-
forts and to do without arms exports, rather than to provide aid during and after wars.
This aid might ease immediate suffering, but, the causes of the suffering are not dimin-
ished. Also, it becomes increasingly apparent that armament and wars destroy decades of
efforts to alleviate poverty. How can people and societies be convinced to support coop-
eration in development issues and to give money for development aid, if the militaristic
behaviour of the industrial countries in international relations is found attractive and is
imitated by many Third World countries. Therefore, it is mainly the opponents of arms
export who point out the dangers to peace, which are linked to such export.
Apart from the exchange of arguments, there is an additional quality that characterises
the debate over the pros and cons of arms export. This quality is connected to the atmos-
phere of this controversy and relates to fairness and, therefore, to the ability to realise
basic democratic principles. Individuals and groups who have committed themselves to
the fight against arms exports have acquired a certain knowledge of the subject, which
they use to penetrate this opaque and often scandalous field of politics. This enables them
to collect information, to fit these pieces of information together and to publish the
knowledge so acquired and their conclusions, in order follow the trails of the background
and interrelationships of the international arms trade and German participation therein.
Meanwhile, in so doing, they have made contact with a lively international ‘community’,
which has decided to demand more democracy in the name of the ‘civil society’ (Zivilge-
sellschaft). The arms export controversy has therefore become more fundamental.
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In view of this, the credibility of the debate and of its participants is significantly af-
fected when the arms export debate in Germany is misused as a platform for other con-
troversies. Indeed, because the combatants on the political stage know about the sensitiv-
ity of this subject, they score political points by presenting their opponents with the irrec-
oncilable contradiction in terms between conviction and practice. The opposition in the
German parliament rightly senses here the possibility of splitting the governing coalition
over this issue. The senior partner in government, the SPD, on the other hand asks the
smaller coalition party, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, to challenge its own followers and their
pacifist convictions. Whereas the agreement of the coalition partners on other questions,
for example the approval of German participation in the NATO mission against Yugosla-
via, was considered self evident, the decision about the delivery of a test consignment of
Leopard II tanks to Turkey, with the view to a later, more substantial, order, nearly
caused the collapse of the coalition in 1999. A comparatively minor controversial issue
became a matter of principle. At the same time, on an administrative level, some govern-
ment departments try to influence bodies such as the Bundessicherheitsrat – the cabinet
committee on security, which is responsible for discussing and making decisions about
sensitive arms export licences. Often enough, the foreign office and the ministry for in-
ternational development, responsible for the assessment and review of the human rights
situation, the social condition and the developmental policies of the receiver state, loose
out when they present their objections to the Ministries of Defence and Trade and In-
dustry and the prime minister’s vote becomes decisive.
Therefore, the debate over the pros and cons of arms export can be characterized by a
certain asymmetry of arguments that cannot be balanced. The two aspects of the debate –
on the one hand the insistence on a rational realpolitik, on the other, the plea for actions
governed by and in concordance with established norms - lead to the question, why is it
not possible to mediate between these two positions? The answer, it is assumed, is that
this conflict provides a practical illustration of the incompatibility between vested inter-
ests and norms.
1.2. The hopes for a legislative solution
What makes democracy different from other forms of government is, amongst other
things, the tolerance, to the point of institutionalisation, of differences of opinion and
expression of conflicting interests. In democracies, such disputes are considered to be
efficient in controlling and limiting power. When these disputes reach a conclusion, this
must be done in a way that is in agreement with accepted norms and which convinces the
majority of citizens.
Without exploring further the historical background of this idea, ‘norms’ should be
understood in the context of this article as being behavioural rules, which originate at a
higher level than that of the individual, but which are binding for each member of soci-
ety. These norms shape reality by confronting it with behavioural expectations. In norms,
experiences and expectations are bundled together, the former resulting from the distilla-
tion of the past, the latter, a prediction of future actions and behaviour. Norms therefore
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serve two purposes: On the one hand, they control the stability of social interactions. On
the other hand, they form a bridge between often contrasting experiences and the wish to
depict and formalise social consensus. Norms manifest themselves in the law, which tries
to harmonise norms, procedures and practice.
“The law, seen ‘objectively’, is the epitome of normative, binding rules (norms, but also
structures and procedures, as well as appropriate behaviour) that are valid for a specific
community for a certain period of time and that formally govern communal life […].”2
In a democracy, the law plays a key role, since it determines the behavioural rules that,
ideally, enable opposing views to be debated in public, irrespective of the prevailing dis-
tribution of power.
The law manifests itself in legislation and in the on-going review of political action oc-
curring therein. This aim can only be achieved if the following conditions are met: 1. The
law has to be universally valid and should provide protection from arbitrary decisions. 2.
The law should be enforceable, which includes the possible use of force in cases of non-
compliance. 3. The effect of the law will only become socially acceptable if it is able to
regulate conflicts between norms and vested interests so as to produce a result that is ac-
ceptable to all participants, a precondition for law and order. To achieve this purpose, the
law has to be clear, i.e. an open and comprehensive system of norms, acts of law and pro-
cedures that can be applied in real life. Looked at from a different angle, this entangle-
ment of expectations of the law and its terms and conditions can be solved in the follow-
ing way: The law has to meet a higher ideal of justice that is repeatedly confirmed when it
is applied. This should be complemented by reference to the legality of the process that
leads to the law’s creation.3 Then, political actions based on such law can claim legiti-
macy, accordingly. This legitimacy is an expression both of the link between the legal
system and the law and of the recognition of social and political relationships that are
formed and guaranteed as a result of the law.4
In its application, all law should enable and not hinder actions. It provides a scaffold
of normative reference points and practical procedures that opens up a legitimised space
for all participants who can claim the right to use it, provided they accept it at all. Once
law has become established in a legal system comprising acts of law, then it is regarded as
lasting and stable and cannot easily be challenged. It is only when the law and higher
ideals of justice come significantly into conflict, in a social and political context, that
change has to occur.5
2 Otfried Höffe, Recht, in: Höffe (ed.), Lexikon der Ethik, 5th edition, München (C. Beck) 1997, p. 242.
3 With reference to Wolfgang Huber, Gerechtigkeit und Recht. Grundlinien christlicher Rechtsethik,
Gütersloh (Chr. Kaiser/Güterloher Verlagshaus), 1996, Chapter A II.
4 Discussion of the different understanding of legitimacy by Martin Greiffenhagen, Politische Legitimität
in Deutschland, Gütersloh (Bertelsmann Stiftung), 1997, pp. 44.
5 Cf. Gustav Radbruch, Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht (1946), in: Gustav Radbruch,
Rechtsphilosophie, 8th edition, Stuttgart (K. F. Koehler), 1973, pp. 339–350, p. 345.
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1.3. The importance of the law in the context of arms export trade
Not only does the Federal Republic of Germany declare itself to be a democracy, even
describing itself as “belligerent”, Article 28, Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law (“Grundgesetz”)
also specifically claims that it is “a state based on the rule of law and social justice”. The
nature of the state is defined by the norms formulated in the constitution and the law
governs all legislative, administrative and judicial powers. This is complemented by the
constitutional separation of and balance between legislative and executive powers and by
the legal protection of individual rights from state actions.6 However, the rule of law is
frequently threatened by everyday political life: Are laws executed in accordance with the
norms that are laid down in them? Do “routine legal and bureaucratic procedures“7 act as
a substitute for the review of the law’s content and for the balancing of the legally pro-
tected rights in question? Can the courts review administrative actions and order changes
if applicable? The German nation has already experienced how the principles of the rule
of law can be undermined in the name of the law; therefore, the people are especially
sensitive when the legitimacy of the state’s actions in daily political debate is questioned,
as is happening in the case of the debate over arms export outlined above.
Is this suspicion correct? Do universal norms and particular vested interests collide
and are they not reconciled, as peace under the law requires? If not, we have to ask for the
origin of this on-going underlying conflict. In the following, an attempt is made to ex-
amine whether the law can resolve this conflict in an acceptable manner and, if not, why
it seems unable to do so. Are the legal constructs to blame? Is the basic subject matter of
such a nature, that it is not possible to apply an acceptable and democratic regulatory
approach? What must be done to give the law, as a counterpart of peace, weight and rec-
ognition? The following survey of the system of norms, acts of law and procedures that
currently apply to German arms export presents the existing framework, arranged ac-
cording its German source, in the context of European and global initiatives. As a result, a
picture is produced of several interconnected and interacting levels, leaving an impression
of “extraordinary complexity” and reflecting “an extremely unclear and interlocked
structure of legal rulings of numerous origins” as it was candidly summarised by a legal
commentator.8 Following this survey, a systematic reflection on the present legal situation
will be presented, with reference to its irreconcilable contradiction in terms, followed by a
discussion of different options available to counter the obvious dilemmas.
First of all, three exact definitions are introduced to place the following comments in
context. Firstly, the recognition that the keeping of peace, internally, by the rule of law,
demonstrates the ability of a state to exist peacefully internationally and is a prerequisite
6 Cf. Ernst Benda, Rechtsstaat, term in: Dieter Nohlen/Rainer-Olaf Schulz (eds.), Pipers Wörterbuch zur
Politik, Vol. 1: Politikwissenschaft, 2nd edition, München/Zürich (Piper), 1987, pp. 837–840, p. 839.
7 Ernst Fraenkel, Rechtsstaat. Term in: id. /Karl Dietrich Bracher (eds.), Staat und Politik, new edition,
Frankfurt /Main (Fischer), 1964, pp. 283-291, p. 288.
8 Ulrich Karpenstein, Europäisches Exportkontrollrecht für Dual-Use Güter, Stuttgart (Boorberg), 1998
(Schriften zum öffentlichen, europäischen und internationalen Recht, Vol. 7), p. 72.
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for the intentions here and for the search for answers to the questions raised. If peace,
democracy and the rule of law are supposed to go hand in hand, then the debate over
arms transfers provides an opportunity to test the sincerity of this intent. However, the
practice of arms exports repeatedly places democracies in a state of crisis, with regard to
how they understand themselves, particularly as it is predominantly democracies that
provide the world with arms. Germany is amongst these. Indeed, Germany came sixth in
the global league table of arms export in the year 2000.9 Over and above the export of
arms to NATO-states, including Turkey, whose democratic status is controversial, more
than 40 percent of Germany’s arms exports (mainly warships and the materials required
to manufacture them) and about 20 percent of transfers of defence equipment go to
states with constitutions that have, at least, very different standards to Germany, if not
being in complete contradiction in their guiding norms. The recognition of this awk-
wardness has already lead to the suggestions that Germany should only export weapons
to other democracies 10 – a radical alternative that is impressive in its simplicity but which
raises question about the comparability of democratic systems of government. Neverthe-
less, we will return to a modified version of this idea towards the end of this article. Be-
fore this, the search for a workable law for arms exports exists, if the transfer of arms and
defence equipment is not to be abandoned completely.
Secondly, reflection on this topic always raises the question whether and to what ex-
tent the law, as laid down in acts of law, actually meets general ideas of justice. It becomes
clear that the law is talked about using two different codes: On the one hand, the law is
understood as the way of expressing secularised morals, on the other, the law is seen as
being the sum of all acts of law. Whereas one point of view continues to insist on a link
between justice and law, the other does not require this, regardless of whether this link,
which existed originally, is acknowledged. Every application of the law is performed in
the name of justice. However, justice needs the law to transform general ideas into con-
crete instructions.11 Following the principles expressed by Immanuel Kant, it could be
said that the application of the law is accompanied by a requirement to act dutifully. The
law takes advantage of the fact that its importance is founded on logic and the authority
of logic, as was pointed out by Montaigne when he wrote: “The power of the law goes
undisturbed not because it is just, but because it is law.“12 Lawyers will be less irritated by
this double code of the law than politicians, since the latter not only have the duty to
produce and maintain fixed rules, but they are also assessed by moral standards – and this
assessment is the burden that can be felt in the debate about arms export.
9 According to a survey by Richard Grimmet, for the US-Congressional Research Service, Conventional
Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1993–2000, cited in: The Guardian, 21st August 2001.
10 Cf. Katja Frank, Nur an Demokratien liefern. Plädoyer für eine andere Rüstungsexportpolitik, Frank-
furt/Main 2000 (HSFK-StandPunkte 3/2000).
11 Cf. Jacques Derrida, Gesetzeskraft. Der „mystische Grund der Autorität“, Frankfurt/Main (Suhrkamp),
1991/1996, p. 46.
12 Michel de Montaigne, Essais, translated into German by Hans Stilett, Frankfurt/Main (Eichborn), 1998,
3rd book, 13th essay „Über die Erfahrung“, pp. 537–566, p. 541.
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Thirdly, the following discussion cannot replace a thorough description of and com-
mentary on the complex of problems from a legal point of view. However, questions
about arms export law are only marginally dealt with in legal literature, in particular in
the form of dissertations and single articles, a treatment that bears no relation to the in-
tensity of the public debate.13 The legal basis of German arms export politics is usually
only questioned by those who are interested in the implications of arms transfers for
peace and security politics.14 The following thoughts are founded in the author’s direct
experiences15 of the daily political debate on the pros and cons of arms export. They ex-
plain the need, discussed in detail in the following, to determine the foundations and
premises on which decisions are made, which seems to continuously feed the debate
about arms exports, and they indicate where new options could be found. Yet, the author
is guided by confidence that the law gives the opportunity for this, following the rules of
democracy.
2. The system of norms and legal and procedural rules
for German arms export
2.1. Definitions: Arms and defence equipment
The term “arms export” sums up the cross-border transfer of a specific category of goods.
To begin with, these goods can be characterised by the statement that they do not pro-
mote peoples’ wellbeing but, rather, aim to disturb and destroy it. In contrast to other
goods, the user benefits from the potential damage these goods can do to somebody
13 As assessed by Hubertus von Poser und Groß Naedlitz, Die Genehmigungsentscheidung nach dem
Kriegswaffenkontrollgesetz, Frankfurt/Main (Peter Lang), 1999, p. 10. Details about the Arms Export
Control Law see Klaus Pottmeyer, Kriegswaffenkontrollgesetz. Ein Kommentar, 2nd edition, Köln (Carl
Heymanns) 1994.
14 Begin with Uli Jäger/Wolfgang Schwegler-Romeis/Wolfgang Berger, Rüstung ohne Grenzen? Die bun-
desdeutsche Rüstungsexportpolitik und die Militarisierung der Dritten Welt. Ein Hand- und Material-
buch, Tübingen (Verein für Friedenspädagogik), 1989 and frequently emphasized by the peace re-
searcher Hans J. Gießmann, id. Die Regierung muss belegen, warum ein Waffenexport gewollt ist, in:
Frankfurter Rundschau, 1st December 1999 and id., Gute Waffen, schlechte Waffen? Streit um Rüs-
tungsexporte, in: Ulrich Ratsch, Reinhard Mutz, Bruno Schoch (eds.), Friedensgutachten 2000, Mün-
ster-Hamburg (Lit) 2000, pp. 158–167.
15 The author is member of the ‘Arms Exports Committee’ (Rüstungsexporte) that was founded by the
Joint Conference Church and Development (Gemeinsame Konferenz Kirche und Entwicklung, GKKE)
in 1997 and that produces an annual report on the newest developments. Gemeinsame Konferenz
Kirche und Entwicklung (GKKE), Rüstungsexportbericht, published by the Arms Export Committee,
Bonn (GKKE), annually since 1997. Also see: Bernhard Moltmann, Vor dem Sprung in eine neue Ära –
Die deutsche Rüstungsexportpolitik, Frankfurt/Main (HSFK-StandPunkte 1/2001).
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else.16 Therefore, the transfer of these goods always implies a judgement of the possible
intentions of the user. This is obviously a group of goods that form their own class, the
transfer of which have to be governed by special rules, if the supplier – usually a state –
does not want to be suspected of putting peace at risk and of promoting war. This allega-
tion demonstrates how difficult it is to objectively define what exactly is exported, as,
from the start, a debate threatens to break out concerning the pros and cons of particular
intentions and reasons. As these goods can also be used for the defence of states and so-
cieties, the debate about arms export and its legitimacy is also involved in triggering a
fundamental political argument as to whether defence supported by arms is right. And in
Germany in particular, this discussion is coloured by previous experiences of justifica-
tions and suspicions.
When this category of goods is investigated in detail, then it becomes clear that there
are at least five different concepts in use, in context of German law and in the political
debate linked to it.
(1) Arms: The Arms Control Law (Kriegswaffenkontrollgesetz, KWKG) defines these
arms as ’destined to be used in war’, i.e. they have the ability ‘to cause destruction of or
damage to people and things’ and can ‘be used as means of violence in armed conflicts
between states’. What ‘items, materials and organisms’ are to be regarded as arms are
specified by the ‘List of Arms’: The federal government is authorised to continuously
update this list, according to § 1, Par. 2 of the KWKG.
At present, the List of Arms (appendix of the KWKG) contains 62 items that are
grouped in the following way:
“Missiles; combat aircrafts and helicopters; warships and floating support vehicles; combat
vehicles; light antitank guns, flame guns; mine laying and mine throwing systems; torpe-
does; mines; bombs; independent munitions; other essential components; dispensers (for
the systematic distribution of submunitions); laser weapons.17
So called ‘arms (for war)’ also appear in the export list defined by the Law for Foreign
Trade (Außenwirtschaftsgesetz) and the equivalent decree (see below): List of arms, mu-
nitions and defence equipment. However, it does not contain vehicles, transport helicop-
ters, training aircraft etc., even if these could be mounted with arms on-site. It also does
not include armoured vehicles that could take arms but which, not being exclusively de-
signed for this purpose, are not regarded as arms, as intended by the list.18
(2) Defence equipment: There are no general rules about defence equipment. Goods
(including those that are regarded as arms for war) are classified as defence equipment
according to the details of the list in the appendix of the Decree for Foreign Trade
16 This is the assessment that forms the basis of the document, which has been published by the Pope’s
council Justitia et Pax: id., Der internationale Waffenhandel. Eine ethische Reflexion, Rom, 21st June
1994.
17 List of Arms, version 26th February 1998.
18 According to Jäger et al. (footnote 14), p. 38.
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(Außenwirtschaftsverordnung, AWV). Goods are grouped with a different system to the
one that is used for the List of Arms. Therefore, the lists cannot directly be related to each
other.
(3) Goods that promote arms and war, e.g. plant and documentation for the manufac-
ture of arms.
(4) Dual-use goods, that is those, which can serve both military and civil purposes.
Therefore, it is not the intention of the manufacturer that is important but, rather, the
value of the dual-use to the purchaser. Consequently – as Nikita Khrushchev aptly com-
mented – even trouser buttons might be counted amongst dual-use goods. This is be-
cause, according to Khrushchev, soldiers would have only one hand free to shoot if they
had to hold their trousers with the other one.19
(5) Military equipment: This term increasingly covers all goods that form part of the
equipment of the armed forces. It can be found, for example, in the report of the
Weizsäcker Commission20, but also appears in journalistic and political rhetoric. It was
first used as a legal term in the skeleton agreement of six EU member states on the 27th
July 2000. This agreement says: “Military equipment stands for all arms, arm systems,
ammunition, aircraft, ships, land vehicles, boats and other means of warfare, as well as all
their parts or components and accessory documents.” Much as it might be convenient to
have such an all encompassing term at one’s disposal, it is also dangerous in that legal
differences are smoothed out and the impression is created that all these items could be
treated equally.
2.2. From norms to procedures
The system of norms, legal rules, practical procedures, political declarations of intent,
bilateral and international agreements form a complex regime, in which arms exports are
controlled. However, the term “control” leaves open the question as to whether mere
monitoring or active and intentional limitation of arms export is intended. Which inter-
pretation one accepts depends, in the end, on what is given priority – norms and legal
interpretation or practical needs. Is one aspect overtaken by the other (dimension of
time) or is one used against the other (dimension of argument or opportunism)? In Ger-
many, one can assume that practical procedures are carried out in the light of restrictions
on such deals laid down in norms and intended politically. At the same time, it can be
assumed that the economic and technological dynamics inherent in the topic of arms
export place the people involved under pressure to revise norms or even to rewrite them
on the quiet. General bills loose their bite and their outlines become blurred. The deci-
19 Citation as in Karpenstein, as above (footnote 8), p. 112.
20 Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr. Report of the Commission („Weizsäcker-
Kommission“) to the government, Berlin 2000, p. 118.
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sion-making process becomes more and more difficult and every single case turns into a
significant political issue.
This state of affairs is due to the above-mentioned problem that different, superim-
posed, levels of law apply, but is also due to the sensitive reactions of the public, which
are difficult to predict. The norms of arms export politics have a variety of origins, claim
to cover various areas and are binding to different degrees. Currently, arms export poli-
tics is governed by the framework of German rules and rules arising in the EU context.
“European law and national law cannot be summarised in one national law or in one na-
tional decree. The European law is immediately valid in the member states and has priority
over national rulings. However, it covers export control only partially.“21
This mixture of national and European frameworks is embedded in a transeuropean-
transatlantic context, as in the OSCE or in developing global initiatives that are situated a
level above the single EU states. These frameworks mainly indicate political intentions but
are not legally binding rulings and their impacts are therefore limited.
2.2.1. Frameworks of German origin
Article 26, Paragraph 2 (GG (Basic Law))
The normative roots of German export politics are found in the Basic Law. Article 26,
Par. 2 says: “The manufacture, the transport and distribution of arms that are designed
for war can only be carried out with approval of the federal government. Further details
are given in an act of Federal Law.” One of the founding fathers of the Basic Law, Carlo
Schmid, commented on this article that “the intention was to give […] a clear and simple
declaration, that canons were never more to be built in Germany, neither for German nor
for foreign use.“22 More than fifty years have passed since Carls Schmid spoke these
words and Germany has grown to be one of the biggest global arms exporters.
The Arms Control Law (KWKG, Kriegswaffenkontrollgesetz) of 1961
The Arms Control Law (KWKG) sees itself as the law responsible for executing the ruling
in the Basic Law. The KWKG repeats the ban on ABC arms and defines the conditions for
the manufacture, the transport and the distribution of arms. In detail, advance approval
is needed for the following:
– the manufacture, purchase and transfer of arms;
– the transport of arms within the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, in-
cluding import and export, but also the transit or trans-shipment of arms that have
not been manufactured or stored in Germany.
21 Grundzüge des Exportkontrollrechts, Grundwerk February 1997, Handbuch des Exportkontrollrechts
(HADDEX), published by Bundesausfuhramt, Eschborn 1997, Number 10.
22 Citation as in Jäger, see above (footnote 14), p. 36.
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– the transport of arms outside the territory of the Federal Republic with boats or planes
that are registered in Germany;
– the agreement or negotiation of contracts for the purchase of arms that are located
outside the territory of the Federal Republic.
The federal Ministry for Trade, Industry and Technology is responsible for the issue of
licences (the Exchequer, the Home and Defence Ministries also deal with arms and issue
licences, in cases that fall within their portfolios.) Therefore, the power to grant licences
was given to an authority that is really dedicated to promoting exports and that is not
interested in restricting, let alone stopping them. According to § 6 KWKG, nobody is
entitled to be granted a certain licence.
“Permission must not be granted if there is a danger that the arms might be used in a way
that endangers peace, if duties of the Federal Republic of Germany under international law
are compromised or if the applicant can not be relied upon to act responsibly. In all other
cases, the federal government decides on the issue of export licenses at their own discre-
tion, following the guideline laid down in the ‘Political Principles for Arms Export and the
Export of Other Defence Equipment’. Since mid 1998, decisions made also take into ac-
count the criteria of the EU code of conduct that has now become the core of the newly
drafted ‘Political Principles’.“23
The KWKG applies to dealings in “arms”. In practice, this means that
“firstly, approval according to the KWKG (‘Permission for Transport for the Purpose of
Export’) is needed for the export of arms, secondly, an export licence according to the Law
for Foreign Trade (AWG/AWV); this applies equally for the transport into other EU
states.“24
The Law for Foreign Trade (AWG)
The Law for Foreign Trade (AWG) contains the basic regulations for trade with other
countries. It does not contain any prohibitions or licence requirements, but authorises
the federal government to regulate these questions by decree. In so doing, the govern-
ment has to take into account two important limitations. For every regulation, the free-
dom of trade with other countries has to be weighed against a necessary prohibition or
licence. The AWG is strongly influenced by the idea of a free market economy and con-
siders free trade as a priority because, according to § 1, par. 1 AWG, trade with other
countries is free as a matter of principle. Exports are inhibited or require approval only
when determined by the AWG itself or by a decree. The type and extent of prohibitions
and licence requirements have to be designed in a way that minimises the impact on the
free trade (§ 2, par. 3 AWG Principle of Minimal Impact on the Freedom of the Citizen).
Given the choice between prohibition and licence requirement, the latter is the more
lenient measure. Also, the federal government is authorised to restrict the trade with
other countries only for a given set of reasons. These reasons are given in the regulations
23 Federal government report on their export policies for conventional defence goods in 1999 (Rüstung-
sexportbericht 1999), dated 20th September 2000, p. 3–4.
24 Ibid., p. 3.
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that authorise the issue of decrees: In export control law, § 7 AWG is instrumental in
authorising the issue of decrees:
“Accordingly, prohibitions and licence requirements can be introduced in order to ensure
the safety of the Federal Republic of Germany and to prevent disturbances of the peace
nationally or disturbances of the relationship between the Federal Republic of Germany
and other countries.”25
The Decree of Foreign Trade (AWV) contains individual prohibitions and licence re-
quirements, in so far as they have not meanwhile been covered by EU regulations.
“Therefore, there are licence requirements for the export of defence equipment and for
dual-use goods that appear on the export list under special national items and to certain
degree for those not listed. Additionally, according to the AWV, transfer of defence goods
that are contained on the common EU export list requires a licence if the sender is aware
that the final recipient is located outside the EU.”26
“Export of so-called other defence goods has to meet the requirements of the export regu-
lations of the AWG/AWV. On the basis of the principle of freedom of trade that is inherent
in the AWG, every applicant has the fundamental right to be granted an export licence (§ 1
together with § 3 AWG) if this does not present an infringement of legally protected rights
as given in § 7 par. 1 AWG, in which case a licence must not be granted. […] The Federal
Export Department is in charge of the granting or refusing of export licences according to
the AWG/AWV. It will present sensitive cases to the Federal Government for political
judgement.”27
The ”Political Principles of the Government in Relation to the Export of Arms and other
Defence Equipment”
Having restarted in the late 1950’s and 1960’s, arms production in Germany quickly
needed to exploit all the latitude for producing regulations given to the federal govern-
ment by the legislature. This was the aim of the so called “Political Principles”, the first
version of which passed through parliament in 1971, followed by a amendment in 1982.
Currently, the Political Principles of the 19th January 2000 are in force. The wording of
the current version tries to bridge between:
– the necessary limitations of economic activities in this field and the pressure of eco-
nomic and technological expansion, as well as constraints of political circumstances at
home and abroad;
– the originally restrictive German regulations and the later commitment to Germany’s
alliances in the fields of security- and military politics;
– the aim of the government in power at the time to follow policies in arms export that
are in harmony with foreign, security and development policies and the pressure of
the German arms industry to allow participation in the expanding global arms market
and for maintained or increased competitiveness;
25 HADDEX, see above (footnote 21), number 14.
26 Ibid., number 15.
27 Federal government report, see above (footnote 23), p.4.
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– the maintenance of national sovereignty in questions of arms export politics and the
increasing trans-national cooperation, to the point of merger, of arms manufacturers;
– the continuation of known decision-making procedures that can be predicted, to a
certain degree, by those involved and the permanently changing debate in society and
politics that is reflected in different lists of priorities and in the consequent controver-
sies.
In the view of the dilemmas inherent in political practice, it is inevitable that every ver-
sion of the “Political Principles” is characterised by compromises between different inter-
ests and is not only interpretable but, in fact, in need of interpretation itself. The basic
aim of the “Political Principles” is not to restate the prohibition of arms transfers. Rather,
the Political Principles describe the different conditions that are prerequisite for the
granting, the limitation and the prohibition of arms exports. Prohibition is only one of
several possible actions. On the one hand, in the current version, which determines the
decision-making process today, decisions are made on the basis of new criteria, with new
contents that have been defined in the 1998 EU code of conduct. On the other hand,
more than in previous versions, barriers have been erected that should ensure a safe final
destination for the arms transferred. Decisions about the delivery of individual pieces of
defence equipment are made according to stricter standards than those that apply within
the scope of defence cooperations.
The “Political Principles” attempt to do justice to the fundamental dilemmas men-
tioned, by introducing a further central distinction, over and above the lists of goods that
are laid down in law. Distinction is made between states that can be given arms as a mat-
ter of principle and without limitations and those for which the further restrictions con-
tinue to apply. The “Political Principles” distinguish between:
1. NATO member states (for which the NATO Contract, Art. 6 applies), EU member
states and states that have NATO equivalent status (Australia, New Zealand and Swit-
zerland). Export of arms and other defence equipment into these countries is not to
be restricted as a matter of principle, unless special political reasons apply in individ-
ual cases, which might demand a limitation.
2. Other countries: Should the receivers of deliveries of arms and other defence equip-
ment be located in other countries, permission is granted in a restrictive manner. The
export of arms is allowed only in individual exceptional cases that are in the interests
of the security of Germany and her allies. Transfer of defence equipment is only al-
lowed if German security, national peace and foreign relations are not endangered.
Additionally, the human rights situation and the developmental perspectives of the
receiving country have to be taken into account, including the regional stability and
the danger of internal conflicts. In the decision-making process, these restrictions are
to be more highly regarded than the economic interests of Germany in free and un-
restricted trade.
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2.2.2. EU-Frameworks
The legal character of the European Union has been discussed at great length: Is the EU a
federation of states with an authority that is derived from the renunciation of the mem-
ber states’ sovereignties? Does the execution of economic, political and social coopera-
tion, as well as integration in the EU create a legal entity that can demand its own
authority and legitimacy?28 The impression of such a two-faced approach is also found in
the field of arms export politics within the context of the European Union. On the one
hand, the member states insist on their national prerogatives. They plead their sover-
eignty and try to continue with their traditional policies with respect to arms export
practices in a way as unrestricted as possible. On the other hand, EU-states find it impos-
sible to withstand tendencies towards cooperation on the questions of requirement for
armament, manufacture and marketing, in order to reduce costs and increase the strength
of shared military and technological capabilities, but also in order to compete with US
American rivals. Finally, the EU member states, together with other states, cannot avoid
the necessity of acting against the distribution of arms and goods that are globally re-
garded as particularly dangerous, such as missiles and nuclear, biological and chemical
arms and their components (dual-use goods).
The EU agreement as given in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997
According to Art. 296, Par. 1, Letter b of the Amsterdam Treaty, the arms export policies
of the EU member states a matter of national sovereignty. The original passage reads:
“Any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of
the essential interests of its security, which are connected with the production of or trade
in arms, munitions and war material; [...]“29
Both, the Weizäcker Committee, in its report on the future of the Federal army, and the
government itself make efforts to initiate changes in this situation. These efforts are de-
signed to include arms export politics in the EU Catalogue of Competences that describes
the common tasks of the EU.
Dual use goods
By contrast, dual-use goods fall under the aegis of the Community Law of the European
Union. The EU regulations for dual-use goods of 1st July 1995 represent an important
step towards harmonisation of export control in the EU member states. Meanwhile, there
are standardised procedures for the issue of export licences for such goods. The member
states have agreed on common control lists, developed criteria for the decision-making
process and created lists of countries that can be the subject of simplified control proce-
dures. Moreover, the individual EU member states can issue even more restrictive regula-
tions within their own spheres of activity. Export control experts have since reported that
28 For details about this debate see: Klaus Dieter Wolf (ed.), Projekt Europa im Übergang? Probleme, Mo-
elle und Strategien des Regierens in der Europäischen Union, Baden-Baden (Nomos), 1997.
29 Citation as in Karpenstein, see above (footnote 23), p.10.
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the regulation has been successful in practice and that the mutual agreements on com-
mon control procedures work well. This should serve as evidence for the non-fulfilment
of negative expectations with respect to community actions.
The EU Code of Conduct for Arms Exports, 1998
In view of the evident lack of common arms export policies and urged on by public de-
bate in the member states, in particular the UK and the Scandinavian countries, the EU
member states adopted a common code of conduct in the form of a government resolu-
tion with respect to this field on the 8th June 1998. It lists a number of criteria that na-
tional governments should take into account when deciding on approval or denial of
licences. These include:
– existing embargoes decreed by international organisations such as the UN or OSCE;
– the recipient’s country’s situation with respect to human rights;
– the internal situation in the country of final destination;
– danger to regional peace and security;
– aspects of the social and economic development of the recipient country.
It is due to both the change of the political climate and the pressure of many non-
governmental organisations that the human rights aspect now ranks highly in the cata-
logue of criteria. Organisations involved in classical development work are already start-
ing to fear that other aspects relevant here – for example the relationship between mili-
tary and social spending – are losing importance, particularly as they represent long term
parameters which are often beyond the immediate scope of political arms export deci-
sions.
Moreover, the Code intends there to be a consultation procedure for cases when li-
cences for arms deliveries are refused in one EU member state and therefore a second
application is made in a different member state. Additionally, the European parliament
will be informed annually about national arms deliveries, particularly as most EU states
have meanwhile adopted the practice of presenting national “arms export reports’.
Still, flaws remain: Transactions via agents are not covered, the result of the consulta-
tion procedures remains vague, and there are no strict and enforceable rules about the
final destination. Nevertheless, the effects of the EU Code of Conduct have been received
positively by experts and the public alike. Meanwhile, some EU member states, such as
Germany, have adopted the Code in their national control regime. Since 1998, a further
seventeen states outside the EU have already stated their intent to adopt the listed criteria
as the basis for their own decisions about arms exports. However, only in the long run
will application of the Code of Conduct show whether this instrument, this “contrat de
confiance,“30 is sufficient to build confidence amongst the EU member states with respect
30 Karpenstein, see above (footnote 8), p. 91.
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to each other’s national control practices and in the mutual exchange of information, so
that it can be made into an efficient tool for common actions.
European harmonisation of military cooperation and arms export policies
For some time, the arms industry has pressed for uniform legal and political conditions
in the EU. Arms manufactures demand a common market for military goods, standardi-
sation of arms export policies and financial, as well as political support for the process of
consolidation within the sector. These demands are a consequence both of increasing
pressure from US-American arms manufactures in the international arms market and of
the imminent modernisation of the armed forces of the European states which expect the
manufactures to provide arms at minimal costs in order to improve their efficiency. The
arms supply to individual national armed forces by their own arms industry does not
guarantee sufficient income, particularly as arms manufacturers increasingly specialise or
merge to become international companies.31
The defence ministers of Germany, France, the UK, Italy, Sweden and Spain signed a
skeleton agreement that initiates the restructuring and common activities of the European
arms industry on 27th July 2000. This contract in international law contains regulations
for secured supply, procedures relating to export matters, the handling of information
relevant to security, the promotion of common research, the control of technology
transfer and – finally – the harmonisation of the military needs. All in all, all aspects of
arms transfer between the participating states are facilitated. For the export of jointly
produced military goods to recipients outside the EU, so called white lists, prepared in
advance, will be in force for export into safe countries. This is the end of the existing
principle that responsibility for arms export lies with the country in which the final as-
sembly takes place. Up to now, key German components were often exported to France,
the UK or Italy who then had to decide about the export of the final product. Germany
only took part in the process via the consultation procedures and had no right to veto.
Sooner or later, the contract of 27th July 2000 will replace the web of bilateral arms co-
operation agreements that have existed, at a governmental level, between many EU and
NATO states since the sixties. One of the best known of these was the Schmidt-Debré
Agreement between Germany and France, adopted in 1972. The advocates of the new
contract hope to create harmony between politically approved declarations of intent and
the technological and industrial cooperations that can lead to the merger of companies. It
is evident that the contract aims to promote military cooperation in Europe and to stand
up to US-American competition. In contrast, the accompanying harmonisation of export
policies appears as a side effect. For the moment, it remains unclear if the interests of the
signatory states in participating in this extensive military cooperation have priority over
the intention of continuing the practice of restrictive issue of arms export licences, al-
31 Hartmut, Küchle, Rüstungsindustrie im Umbruch. Strategien deutscher Unternehmen und Ansätze
einer europäischen Neuorientierung, Baden-Baden (Nomos), 2001 (BICC Schriften zu Abrüstung und
Konversion, Vol. 4).
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though the text of the agreement emphasises its relationship with the EU Code of Con-
duct.32 Meanwhile, the outline contract has come into force in Germany. In view of Am-
sterdam Treaty, which remains in force, the skeleton agreement of 27th July 2000 in a
sense presents a new, intermediate, stage of cooperation between the state and the private
economy, because individual states have given up national prerogatives in favour of po-
litically determined, trans-border cooperation within the arms industry.
2.2.3. Developments on international level
The developments outlined in the German and the European systems for control of in-
ternational arms transfer did not come out of the blue. They are the result of academic
and journalistic debates and public initiatives. Frequently, they were initiated by non-
governmental organisations33, academic institutions34 or by journalists and met with a
good response in a variety of international platforms.35 Additionally, industry and mili-
tary politicians have tried to influence permanently the policies, in their own interests. At
the same time, forces are encountered that are working against such developments. It can
be assumed that such forces arise from the defence industry, which is often still under
national control, as in France. They also arise from politically motivated reservations
about the handing-over of responsibilities in the field of arms export politics from the
sphere of national sovereignty to the one of common European actions. The example of
the EU member states demonstrates, in particular, how different the political cultures are
and how politics, public and economic interests work together.
A potentially swiftly arising insight that is based on economic and political logic and
that requires changes in the decision-making criteria and structures does not necessarily
lead to an immediate change of policy in the political reality of the EU. On the contrary,
delaying tactics are widely employed, even in Germany, and are used to obstruct objective
and political developments and to force compromises to be made, which detract from the
original impetus. Therefore, it would make sense to use the field of European arms export
politics as an example in order to publicly criticise the agonizingly slow reorientation of
32 Gemeinsame Konferenz Kirche und Entwicklung (GKKE), Rüstungsexportbericht, published by the
‘Arms Exports Committee’, Bonn: GKKE 2000, pp. 39, and Michael Brzoska/Hartmut Küchle, Folgen,
Auswirkungen und Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten internationaler Abkommen für eine restriktive deutsche
Rüstungsexportpolitik. Gutachten für den Wissenschaftlichen Dienst beim Deutschen Bundestag,
Bonn/Berlin 2001.
33 For example: Saferworld and Amnesty International.
34 For example: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute/SIPRI, and Bonn International Centre
for Conversion/BICC in their annual hand books and in „Friedensgutachten“ published annually, since
1987, by three German peace research institutes – Forschungsstätte der Evangelischen Studiengemein-
schaft, Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicher-
heitspolitik, University of Hamburg.
35 To be mentioned here for example the initiative of Peace Nobel Price winners around the former presi-
dent of Costa Rica, Oscar Arías. See id., introductory speech in: Deutsche Stiftung für Internationale
Entwicklung (DSE)/ Entwicklungspolitisches Forum, Entwicklung und Abrüstung. Internationaler
Politikdialog, Bonn/Petersberg, 31st October–1st November 2000, Berlin: DSE 2000, pp. 37–44.
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political thinking and action. It might be ultimately more efficient to warn against a criti-
cal acceleration of political, technological and economic processes in many cases and to
insist on a “healthy” slowness, which is particularly characteristic for democracies. How-
ever, those tendencies are fatal in a field like the arms export politics, where delays have
consequences that cannot later be repaired. Such negatively rated developments can be
observed inter alia in the arms dynamics in the Middle East, which are supported by arms
exports, in the corruption scandal cases that were based on unclear and contradictory
legal norms and procedures or in the obscure competition of suppliers that leave gaps
sufficient to allow wealthy and powerful buyers to obtain the goods they want.
Therefore, the progress that is reached in forums on international cooperation has an
even greater importance than the above-mentioned social, academic and political initia-
tives. Frequently, the initiatives are taken into account when decision criteria, mecha-
nisms of transparency, definitions of arms and categorisation of countries or suggestions
for procedural handling are formulated. These then indirectly find their way into con-
crete regulatory frameworks such as the ones of the EU. In contrast to the German and
EU frameworks for arms export mentioned above, which are in force in their respective
territories, they have no legally binding effect. The forums express political intentions but
do not posses any authority to put them into force. Therefore, they appeal to states and
governments to voluntarily take up their ideas and use them to direct their own practice,
when the occasion arises. With such a perspective in mind, the following instruments are
mentioned:
The Wassenaar Arrangement
This arrangement developed out of the COCOM regime (Coordinating Committee for
Multilateral Exports Control) in 1994/1995 and is named after the Dutch town where it
was negotiated. The COCOM was founded by the western states in 1949, to prevent the
members of the then Warsaw Pact from having access to new defence technologies. How-
ever, the Wassenaar Arrangement is no longer directed to particular target countries, as
was the case with the COCOM, but meets current needs for controlling the transfer of
certain goods. Therefore, its strength lies in having coordinated goods lists that are taken
into consideration by the participating states. They predominantly include conventional
arms and dual-use goods. More than thirty countries now belong to this successor to the
COCOM regime, including Russia and other states of the former Eastern bloc. The foun-
dation of the regime and the goods lists are not based on international treaties. Rather,
the Arrangement belongs amongst the so-called “gentlemen’s agreements” and is imple-
mented by the participating states on a voluntary basis.
The Wassenaar Arrangement has become an integral component of the international
control regime that is described by HADDEX 1997 as follows:
“The international control regimes have a strong influence on the European and national
export control by means of creation of common goods lists, permanent exchange of in-
formation about sensitive recipient countries and projects and mutual consultations about
questions of a technical, procedural and licensing nature among the members. These re-
gimes are indispensable for efficient export control as they permanently push forward its
necessary harmonisation.”
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Declaration of the OSCE about criteria for the transfer of conventional arms of 24th Novem-
ber 1993
With its declaration in 1993, the OSCE served as a pacemaker for the EU Code of Con-
duct. The declaration describes the efforts to regulate arms transfers to the Middle East
and to prevent the increase in arms capability that was regarded as direct threat to global
peace. The declaration already contained a link between a criteria catalogue for the li-
censing of arms exports and a mutual obligation for consultation amongst member states
and also includes the obligation to permanently adjust the regulations in the light of cur-
rent needs. As might be expected, these elements are also found in the EU Code of 1998,
as its formulation was based on the format that had been successful in the OSCE five
years before, even if the EU Councils of 1991 (Luxembourg) and 1992 (Lisbon) had al-
ready set the course.
The declaration of the OSCE goes beyond the EU framework in that it asks the mem-
ber states, true to the mission of this transatlantic/European organisation, to provide
mutual support, with respect to the planning of restrictive arms export controls. This
support might include the exchange of information, the training of personnel or the set-
ting-up of technical installations to enable the monitoring of compliance with the regula-
tions. These initiatives should primarily benefit Central European and CIS states. This
aspect, in particular, demonstrates that efficient control of arms export has a price.
Therefore, apart from political will and the creation of internal legal conditions, substan-
tial financial backing is needed to give such policies a long lasting and sustained effect.
EU/US joint declaration of 18th December 2000:
Currently, the EU and the US are the starting point for two thirds of all arms exports.
Much as business might flourish, both sides find themselves compelled to react to the fact
that other players, such as Russia, in its most recent arms deals with Iran and India, want
to play a more important role in this field. So, the EU and the US have now paved the
way, in a joint declaration, towards an international code of conduct for arms export
(“international arms sales code of conduct”). On the one hand, the EU cite the positive
effects of their code of conduct, which has been in force since 1998. On the other hand,
the US are proud of the efficiency of their strict control regime that can be characterised
by its tight regulation of the final destinations of arms, compliance with which is regu-
larly controlled.
The EU and the US appeal to all states to be aware of their special responsibilities with
regard to the respect of basic human rights, of freedom, of national and international
peace and the right to fight against terrorism. Additionally, it is stated that the distribu-
tion of the means of mass destruction and its carriers, missiles in particular, are to be
counteracted. In order to advertise their intentions, the EU and the US are prepared to
lead by example and to stand-up for their goal: They declare their intent to increase their
responsibilities, to make the decision-making process for arms export increasingly condi-
tional on the internal situation of the buyer country and to provide greater transparency.
Both initiators mention further suitable instruments already in existence, such as the UN
register of conventional arms transfers, the OSCE and the Wassenaar Arrangement. How-
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ever, they do not mention the importance of a critical public that could be involved, in
the form of academic/scientific expertise, journalism or non-governmental organisations.
The progress of this initiative, started by the joint declaration of the EU and the US, is
currently an open question. The declaration relies on the weakest internationally valid
instrument, since a code of conduct, with its voluntary character, depends heavily on the
goodwill of the participating states to accept the norms. The code of conduct is not legally
binding in international law and it can neither be enforced nor can non-compliance be
punished. Also, governments do not have to ask for the approval of their parliaments and
therefore avoid difficult internal political controversies. Therefore, the repeated claims,
made by the US and the EU, of greater transparency in arms export politics should be
critically reviewed, to check whether they are actually realised in practice. In view of al-
ready tense transatlantic relations, it is doubtful whether either side would wish to risk
initiating another argument about arms exports.
However, this initiative of the largest arms exporters globally indicates that interna-
tional arms control politics has moved on from its preoccupation, in recent decades, with
proliferation and problems of regional stability, particularly in Europe, to global threats
that are linked to the transfer of conventional arms. The EU and the US make this plain
in the declaration, by referring to the current debate about the prohibited trade in small
and light weapons and by suggesting arrangements to bring the dissemination of such
weapons under control. However, the US has given its national prerogative priority over
support for an international control regime for small weapons at the UN small weapon
conference in July 2001.36
The EU and the US will be able to obtain the general support of other trans-national
organisations (for example the Organisation of American States (OAS) and the Organisa-
tion for African Unity (OAU)) for the introduction of an “International Code of Con-
duct for Arms Exports”, particularly as these have already developed similar regional
initiatives and are waiting for support, mainly from the major arms suppliers. Most of the
member states and governments belonging to these organisations suffer from the uncon-
trolled proliferation of small weapons but do not have the means to counter this phe-
nomenon without the help of the very states that are home to the important manufactur-
ers or forwarding agents. It will be more difficult to respect human rights and to make the
fundamental right of freedom the status of a detailed precondition for arms deliveries, as
the interpretation of these rights is controversial in the global context. If the transatlantic
community were to lead here, then they would at least take up the cudgels for their own
ideas.
36 For details on positions held and the course of the UN conference on small weapons see: GKKE-
Rüstungsexportbericht 2001, see above (footnote 15), Chapter 7.
Foundations and perspectives of the German arms export politics 21
3. Arms export and the law: a web of contradictions
In view of the system of regulations, described here, which currently exist in relation to
both national and international arms export policies, the impression is given that legal
and procedural regulation and interpretation is excessive rather than a limiting resource.
This does not result in the highest possible certainty of one’s legal position; rather, the
contrary is true. Certainty regarding one’s legal position is one of the central aims of any
legal system, a point which Germany has had to relearn in view of the argument around
compensation for convicts used in forced labour.
The aim that is described by the term “certainty of one’s legal position” (Rechtssicher-
heit) is clear, simple and correct. The definition of this aim deals with the certainty within
law, that is, it deals with the law itself. It means that the law should bring about the high-
est ideal of justice, in the sense of maintaining peace under the law. The law then provides
protection from arbitrary interference and rules the behaviour of different parties in a
way that is predictable and directed towards the objective of a profitable common life.
This is achieved by the law being precisely and definitely laid down (positivism), applica-
ble with certainty (practicality) and stable (invariability).37 Here again, the ambiguous
meaning of the German term for law (“Recht” means either law or right/just) comes into
play. The meeting of a legal obligation does not yet mean the achievement of justice. For
example, the concept of “Pacta sunt servanda,” which is central to the constitution and to
stability in international relations, does not make any statements as to whether the con-
tent of treaties is just or not. Also, an act of law that applies corporal or capital punish-
ment can be regarded as positive, in the sense of certainty of law, if it excludes arbitrari-
ness, even if it does not meet the requirements of justice.
The system of norms, laws, regulations and procedures that is valid for arms export
politics is also part of this tense double meaning of law and justice and of the intention to
achieve peace under the law that is based on it. On the one hand, the nature of the subject
itself is characterised by politically and economically motivated interference. At the same
time, technological innovation and market changes work against the intention of peace
under the law, in the sense of certainty. On the other hand, contradictions, uncertainties
of definitions and jurisdiction that are inherent in the regulations, as well as ambiguities
of material and political transactions, create a condition that cannot fully be mastered by
legal actions, let alone controlled. From a legal point of view, the situation is commented
on as follows:
“It is, indeed, remarkable that the flood of acts of law that has become necessary, due to
the increase in the number of the state’s duties and the legal integration of all state’s activi-
ties, has not lead to an increase, but rather to a decrease, in knowledge of the law and cer-
tainty of one’s legal position. This uncertainty is caused by the permanently increasing
37 For information about the current German debate see: Rainer Erlinger, Einigkeit und Recht und Si-
cherheit, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 28th March 2001.
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number of acts, the complexity of the respective subject matter and the difficulty of the le-
gal language.“38
As long this situation remains unchanged, the aim of achieving certainty of one’s legal
position, in both a narrow and wider sense, will be far from realisation and this will con-
tinue to spark off regular political controversies. The people and authorities that are di-
rectly involved in the execution of control cannot change anything, much as they might
try to review each single case in a way that meets the requirements of justice and law. A
serious flaw is indicated by the fact that current practice and the authorisation of that
practice fail to rely on rules that meet the need for justice.
With respect to the national and international regulatory frameworks presented, this
deficit is revealed by a number of contradictions. These contradictions form a web, in
which politics and various control regimes are caught time and again. This leads to a de-
valuation of existing law. The profile of these contradictions is raised as they result in a
dogmatically excessive contrasting of positions, which illustrate the dilemma from one
point of view, when really one of two options should be chosen, even though the faults of
both are recognised. Every decision will provoke resistance in one way or another, the
consequences of which have to be taken into account by politicians when selecting one of
the options. Reference to the law does not aid the decision-making process. Five of these
contradictions are to be listed in the following in order to illustrate the argument made:
The prohibition versus allowance of international arms trade.
Article 26, Par. 2 of the Basic Law and the Arms Control Law of 1961 assume the un-
equivocal prohibition of the international arms trade. By contrast, the Law for Foreign
Trade postulates the primacy of unlimited free trade. In practice, the German arms export
politics attempts to escape from this dilemma by introducing the distinction between
“arms” and “(other) defence equipment”. There is no right to obtain an export licence
for “arms”. For “defence equipment” however, there is legally accepted expectation to
trade, albeit under restricting conditions.
The demand for legality is met by the fact that, in addition to the general licence pro-
viso, a special licence is required for the “arms” trade in order to transfer such goods both
within and outside German territory. The original prohibition of the arms trade has
therefore been reduced to the problem of “moving” such products and services.
Qualitative Criteria versus formal country lists: Double standards.
The decision-making process in the issue of arms export licences is governed by compet-
ing qualitative and regional points of view. Apart from aspects of security and peace, the
qualitative criteria reflect the importance of human rights and developmental considera-
tions in the recipient country. The country lists make distinctions between buyer coun-
tries, exports to which are regarded as safe, and countries for which the qualitative criteria
38 Herbert Schambeck, Über Grundwerte und Grundprinzipien europäischer Verfassungen, in: Öster-
reichische Juristenzeitung, Vol. 47, No. 22, 1992, pp. 745–755, p. 754.
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are to be used. The distinction between “good”, “doubtful” and “bad” potential buyers of
German arms and defence equipment leads to a reduced importance of the qualitative
criteria, as it is assumed that they are only valid for a certain fraction of trade partners,
whereas others are exempt from the outset. This “double standard” succeeds more in
confusing rather than clarifying the situation. At least, this is true as long as the inherent
scope for interpretation is used in a politically opportunistic way or if there is suspicion
that it might be.
The example of the controversial German arms exports to Turkey illustrates again and
again how quickly such a two-faced practice can give rise to self-made dilemmas. A simi-
lar conflict opens up when the potential for changing circumstances is taken into account
when making political arms export decisions: As a rule, decisions are made on the basis of
short term, if not current, conditions. However, they do not take into account that arms
and defence goods are long-lived, unless they are exposed to the risk of destruction in
current conflicts. Defence goods that are delivered today can be used in internal conflicts
tomorrow, can be transferred to others or may be a threat to regional security and stabil-
ity in an unknown future and that is without mentioning the long-term social and eco-
nomical consequences of large-scale defence programs that burden the majority of devel-
oping countries. Again, Turkey provides, as Indonesia once did, an impressive example.
Eighteen months ago, German politicians debated an enormous export deal concerning
German tanks. Today, Turkey is at the edge of economic and financial collapse and will
not be able to pay for the costs of such arms purchases. Sooner or later, this will also be
true for the transfer of German submarines and associated technology that has already
begun. Even though Turkey’s fundamental difficulties were already known, this argument
did not appear in the German internal political debate, except for information about the
dire consequences of the earth quake that had hit the country shortly before. A similar
fate might befall the arms deals with South Africa that are, moreover, linked to the
promise to finance extensive measures for the improvement of infrastructure. This is
because accusations of corruption have since been made that include German suppliers
and that undermine confidence in the execution of arrangements made.
National versus international restrictions
Decisions on the approval or denial of permission for arms exports belong to the classic
prerogative of every state and government. The export of arms, defence equipment and
military aid is recognised as an accepted instrument of foreign and security policies. This
principle has survived all the more easily as the production and marketing of arms was
under governmental control, or at least close to it, in the majority of states and in some
still is. Accordingly, single states have developed acts and procedures to control their arms
export policies that reflect their own historical experience and political priorities. Art. 296
of the EU Treaty also reflects such a situation, as it insists on taking this part of the eco-
nomic activities out of what is covered by regulations in the Common Market and leaves
them under national sovereignty.
In political reality, however, the further the imperatives of foreign, security, economic
and technological policy are withdrawn from the domain of national decisions, the
stronger becomes the demand for integration of arms export politics in unified regula-
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tions and procedures. It becomes obvious, however, that despite the growing under-
standing of such necessities, the single states find it still difficult to be led into this. In the
context of the EU, at least the steps of agreeing on a code of conduct for arms export and
acceptance of the Wassenaar Arrangement as “gentlemen’s agreement” indicate a trend
for abandoning national prerogatives and towards a supranational understanding.
The price we have to pay for the current coexistence of national and international
frameworks is the growing number of loopholes that arise and that can be used by clever
arms traders to make deals that lie right at the edge of legality. They take advantage of the
fact that the arms market has become a “buyers’ market” in which the potential purchas-
ers determine the conditions under which deals are made. States attempt to counteract
the public dilemma that is opening up by agreeing on mutual consultations and by mak-
ing various lists of goods that are to be subject to controls. The suspicion remains that
governments cannot keep up with developments, in view of the dynamics of defence
technologies and of the global arms trade.
Governmental agreements versus cooperation in the private sector
Trans-border cooperation in the production and marketing of arms is usually realised on
the basis of previous governmental agreements. In the Schmidt-Debré Agreement of
1972, Germany and France assigned each other fundamental jurisdiction in this field by
defining the conditions for a cooperation between German and French arms manufac-
tures and by determining the procedures that regulate the handling of jointly produced
goods when they are to be exported elsewhere. As a rule, the country in which the final
assembly took place was responsible for decisions on re-export. This relieved the supplier
of the burden of responsibility but also seriously undermined the supplier’s ability to
influence final decisions.
Meanwhile, the wind has changed: Arms manufactures merge; the costs of develop-
ment and production of defence equipment increase; the European manufactures face
growing competition; the global arms market is divided into the marketing of high qual-
ity and cutting edge goods and of goods that have been manufactured under licence or
developed outside the industrial countries, not to mention the increasing trade in second-
hand but still long-lived and operational arms. Under the shadow of these factors, it is in
fact the arms industry that is placing pressure on states to create politically determined
general conditions, covering legal and financial aspects of defence cooperations.
In the Europe of the EU, the governments of six of the most important arms produc-
ing states gave way to this pressure when they signed an appropriate agreement in July
2000. Changes that are to be welcomed from the point of view of promoting European
defence cooperation give rise to substantial suspicions if they serve a policy of restrictive
arms export, as is demanded in the EU Code of Conduct or in the EU/US joint declara-
tion. Here, attempts are again made to escape from the dilemma by using “white lists” of
irreproachable recipient countries. However, it remains to be seen whether the qualitative
criteria continue to have priority in the common arms export policies or if they have
gone to the dogs in the interests of a favoured industrial and political defence coopera-
tion.
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Secrecy versus transparency
Everything that is linked to arms exports remains shrouded in mystery. This is, in part,
due to the way such arms transfers are carried out: Frequently, the whole process, in-
cluding the first expression of interest in a particular item of defence equipment, the na-
tional or private supplier’s undertaking to deliver the item, the granting of the appropri-
ate licences, the actual start of the transfer and its completion, including financial trans-
actions and possible training, may take several years. This is in part because of the prac-
tice that decisions on the approval of export licences are held within the sphere of the
political mandate of the executive. The fact that political decisions about arms exports
become known only after their execution obstructs public debate on the pros and cons of
these exports.
The same applies to the legal system that enforces the law, which can only investigate
cases of non-compliance with legal regulations after transfers have been completed. With
this in mind, it is not surprising that German courts are only now trying to get to unravel
the political and personal constellations that lead to the transfer of armoured vehicles to
the Middle East in the early nineties, a transfer that went against the “Political Principles”
then in force and against the security interests of Germany, as expressed by the military
leadership. Important individuals involved in these events have since left the political
stage or have died; others, like a former secretary of state in the Ministry of Defence, have
gone into hiding in South East Asia. Even if this scandal has, in the meantime, under-
mined the moral and political foundations of one of the major German parties, the com-
ponent elements that caused such erosion do not lack the quality of a gripping political
thriller that contrasts with the respectability that is constantly being claimed for arms
exports, particularly as corruption has not yet been ruled out.
In view of this, churches and other non-governmental organisations have frequently
demanded that the whole complex of arms export politics be made more transparent, i.e.
more comprehensible. A first step in this direction was taken when the United Nations
responded to what was not least a German initiative and created an international register
for transfers of conventional arms in the beginning of the nineties. However, not all the
relevant supplier and receiver countries take part and the notifications received annually
cannot be used as a standard for comparative purposes. Additionally, there are no in-
struments in place that can be used to check the contents of voluntarily given notifica-
tions.39
Nevertheless, the concept of transparency has since entered the political mainstream.
It can be found in the EU Code of Conduct, as well as in the joint declaration on arms
exports of the EU and the US. Many European states have started to publish annual
“arms export reports” to inform their parliaments and the public about transactions in-
volving arms exports. The German federal government presented the first such report in
39 Compare Harald Müller, Früherkennung von Rüstungsrisiken in der Ära der „militärisch-technischen
Revolution“. Ein Register für militärische Forschung und Entwicklung, Frankfurt/Main (HSFK-Report
7/2000), pp. 4–5.
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the year 2000, so fulfilling the promise given by the ruling parties, when their coalition
was formed, three years ago.
Much as this development must be welcomed, since it promotes confidence in politi-
cal actions and opens up the political debate, the withholding of some relevant pieces of
information must be condemned. This applies, for example, to the clear naming of the
relevant suppliers and recipients and of the financial details of the arms transfers. In
Germany, the cause of such flaws is explained by reference to the regulations of the law
determining administrative procedures. According to this law, the authorities do not have
the right to publish information concerning the business secrets of participating compa-
nies, which have been made available during the course of the licensing procedure. How-
ever, exemptions are possible, as demonstrated by the regulations created to permit Ger-
man notification to the UN Arms Register. Even the suggestion of involving a parlia-
mentary body in the process of making decisions on arms exports, similar to the existing
control of the secret services, is far from being realised. To date, it is also remains unclear
whether the on-going intensification of arms cooperation in Europe will satisfy demands
for increasing transparency. At the very least, it cannot be predicted if and to what extent
parliament will be involved in the execution of agreements, having not been involved in
their ratification. As long the contradictions between secrecy and transparency are not
harmonised in direction of greater openness, doubts as to the trustworthiness of arms
export politics will remain and will continue to look bad in a democracy.
The five contradictions distilled-down above can be characterised as having different
degrees of “severity”. They evidently arise partly from gaps in the legal regulations, that
are the result of many intertwining national and EU regulations; they are partly due to
the incompatibilities that come from several equally valid systems of legislation with
contradicting aims that are in competition with each other. Even if one norm is given
priority, in case of such contradictions, it does not mean that the other norm has become
obsolete. This situation is known from moral theory and from the world of theatrical
tragedy.
Finally, constellations can be found in the net of contradictions where two irreconcil-
able principles face each other, both claiming to be right and the ultimate conclusion but
which, when applied, actually annihilate each other. The first contradiction listed has the
character of such an irreconcilable inconsistency in that it consists, on the one hand, of
the prohibition of arms transfers and, on the other, of the principle of free trade. The
distinction made in German law between arms and defence equipment may meet practi-
cal and modern requirements but it is unsatisfactory from a systematic point of view and
with regard to the arms trade control carried out by controlling the transfer of such
goods in practice. This is also true of the double standards that are applied to countries
receiving German defence goods, no matter whether they are categorised as allies or as the
so-called ‘rest of the world’.
In comparison, contradictions based on national prerogatives and on the interests of
the defence industry in an easing of arms transfers can be handled in a more relaxed way.
In both cases, developments are about to occur that will overtake the stated contradic-
tions and replace them with new facts. They will become dated and become part of the
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collection of rhetorical scenery. The main question, about the relationship between law,
peace and democracy, will be more heavily influenced by the problem of transparency,
which has accompanied arms export politics from the outset. To neutralise the inherent
contradiction, actions will be necessary at both a national and a trans-national level.
These actions would be the change of direction, demanded by many, to harmonise events
in the field of arms exports with democratic standards. However, this assessment prepares
us for the following options.
4. What must be done, what can be done?
The current system of norms, pieces of legislation, agreements and procedures that con-
trol arms export and the system’s inherent contradictions give an impression that is any-
thing but satisfactory. The political conflicts, which have accompanied German arms
export politics in the past and which arise again and again, clearly indicate that all is not
well. The law seems to be incapable of regulating the virulent contradictions between
norms and interests, of setting predictable procedures and of punishing violations in an
effective way. On the contrary, the present state of affairs casts doubt as to whether the
general validity, clarity and enactment of current laws can be sufficiently guaranteed. This
rocks the foundations of the legitimacy of arms export politics – the question arises as to
whether this is a situation that calls for a fundamental examination and reorientation of
arms export politics. At this point, with regard to the law, Johann Wolfgang Goethe, who
formulated the following insight based on his legal expertise, is frequently cited: “It is
better to experience injustice than to live in a world without law. Therefore, everybody
should obey the law.” Thus, a legally determined situation is regarded more highly than
one that is characterised by irreconcilable contradictions. This has validity only in the
circumstances of a democracy, where the functioning of the law is put to the test every
day and is confirmed by the persons involved, by the on-going renewal of society’s un-
written contract that is the foundation of the law’s rule.40 With decreasing confidence in
the ruling power of the law, a major component of its efficacy is lost. In the following, a
plea for a revision of the foundations of arms exports will be presented. In so doing, the
current circumstances of international arms transfer have to be taken into account.41
Therefore, a scenario for German arms export politics will be presented below, which
takes into account the obvious differentiation of the global arms trade. Long-term op-
tions are the aim of these considerations. They should reduce the dilemma of the current
arms export politics and correspond to the normative targets of policies founded on
peace, security and the promotion of development that is anchored in the principles of
40 Cf. Höffe, see above (footnote 2), p. 243–244.
41 See also Roger Williamson, Moving in Vicious Circles: The Moral Dilemmas of Arms Trade and Weap-
ons Manufacture, in: Jonathan Moore (ed.), Hard Choices. Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Inter-
vention, Lanham (Rowman & Littlefield Publ.), 1998, pp. 251–268, p. 256–257.
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democracy, that is itself based on the rule of law.42 The scenario should meet targets that
are valid for political utopias in a positive sense: it should be conceivable, possible and
attainable and suggestions should be made as to “how to act beyond the present day”.43
4.1. The current situation
Although the “cold war” might have come to an end, war, as the means of violent strug-
gle for power within and between societies, has not ceased to exist. However, the number
of states at war with others is in decline. Rather, most armed conflicts take place within
the limits of national borders, even if external interference occurs. In many parts of the
world, the state itself threatens the safety and well being of humans and society by ex-
ploitation and repression. Following the events of 11th September 2001, the world wit-
nessed how a state can regard itself as the victim of an attack carried out by a non-
governmental organisation.
The state’s monopoly on the use of force can be regarded as a major development in
civilisation. The downside of this, however, is the concentration of the means of force in
one hand, when the necessary conditions of law and peace may not be present. Conse-
quently, minorities within a state declare themselves as independent states and the re-
sulting conflicts lead to new wars. The right to autonomy, which, for a long time, was the
guiding maxim in the process of political emancipation, is now presenting its destructive
side – it serves as justification for the destruction of a social order without replacing it
with something equivalent. A similar situation can be observed with the right to self-
defence, accepted by international law. The insistence on this right increases the demand
for arms and impedes the search for non-violent alternatives, to defuse threats and for
settling current conflicts.
These trends feed on the continuous influx of arms. This influx is, however, increas-
ingly complex. Today, mobile arms, such as machine guns and pistols, sniper rifles, anti-
tank grenade launchers, mortars, land mines and others, cause most fatalities in armed
conflicts, of which 90 percent are civilian. These arms were once developed in and dis-
tributed by the industrial states. These states have, however, lost control over their trade;
they are produced under licence in other places – currently in 70 countries – or they
wander from one theatre of war to the next. These tools of war have a life expectancy of
several decades and are, like other mass-produced goods, comparatively cheap. Their
handling does not require any specialist knowledge.
42 The following considerations are based on the wording of Chapter 8 of the GKKE-arms export report
2001, for which the author is also responsible. In this report, numerous ideas of the members of the
GKKE ‘Arms Exports Committee’ have been incorporated.
43 Martin Seel, Drei Regeln für Utopisten, in: Zukunft denken – Nach den Utopien, Merkur, Vol. 55, No.
9/10, 2001, pp. 747–755, p. 749.
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Yet, the industrial states still lie at the source of this stream of arms. They give away
their own surplus stock unwisely, do not control the disarmament programs they initiate
in a sufficiently strict manner and are not capable of preventing arms trade and the fi-
nancing of projects within their own territory. How else could it be explained that, at the
end of the nineties, arms from Albanian depots made their way, via Cyprus and Lebanon,
into the hands of Irish Republican groups, old Argentinean arms appear in Croatia and
arms traders offer for sale defence items, of various origins but mainly from the former
states of the Warsaw Pact, in the capital of Slovakia?
The ambivalent nature of technical instruments and the ever-present risk of a non-
intended use became apparent when civil aircraft were used as weapons in the attacks of
11th September. Here too, the nature of the danger, like that linked to dual-use good
transfers, became evident: In the end, it is the user who decides the purpose of the in-
struments in his hands. The assassins themselves might regard it as a cynical triumph to
have implemented this thought, using classical guerrilla tactics to hurt the enemy at his
most sensitive spot, using means that belong to the enemy’s daily life.
The arms transfer of industrial states, including Germany, consists of technically ad-
vanced, high-quality and expensive defence goods, suitable for armed forces in other
industrial states, in emergent nations or in oil-producing countries. Germany is the global
leader in the export of specialised warships, in particular submarines, and is the leading
supplier of medium-sized and heavy tanks and artillery to other NATO states. Over and
above this, there is the German offer to supply electronic components, various items of
technical military equipment, plant and technical knowledge – the infamous ‘blueprints’.
Moreover, small weapons and guns that have a high status abroad are on offer, as is an
extensive range of dual-use goods.
4.2. Options
The mass distribution of small weapons requires a different control approach to cutting-
edge defence products, just as different structures of arms markets and trade require dif-
ferent responses. Rightly, the first problem is increasingly seen as part of the fight against
trans-border crime, that is linked to the drugs trade and to money laundering, and at-
tempts are being made to put a stop to such illegal deals. Nevertheless, it becomes clear
that the supervision and control of this weapon stream can no longer be dealt with using
the classical instruments provided by the Arms Control Law and the Law for Foreign
Trade. Instead, they fall increasingly under the aegis of existing, or soon to be extended,
national and international criminal laws. Besides, appropriate policies relating to social
and economic development should be intensified, to stem the demand for such weapons.
International conferences, like, for example, the successful conference on the illicit
trafficking in firearms in Vienna in spring 2001, have worded practical suggestions,
which, however, still await realisation. This failure can be put down to the lack of suffi-
ciently powerful instruments, not to mention that the decisive legal regulations have not
yet been implemented in the respective national law. In the meantime, governmental and
non-governmental development aid workers struggle on in places where suffering gives
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rise to demand for arms. Apart from disarmament and conversion campaigns, programs
for mine-clearance and for reform of the police, armed forces and the justice system,
grouped in the ‘sector of security,’ are on the agenda.44 Despite the evident destruction of
economic, ecological and social foundations caused by wars in many parts of the world,
the financial means to deal with these have so far been limited. For example, the German
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development spend 34 million German Marks
on relieving the consequences of past wars in Angola, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.45
Although declarations were quickly made, following the events of 11th September 2001, it
not possible to foresee whether efficient measures, with rapid impact, can be taken.
No matter how urgent these initiatives might be, they do not decrease the pressure to
become active in other sectors of international arms transfer. To ensure a positive out-
come in this respect, possibilities on a political level should be exploited, which are al-
ready provided by existing control and transparency regimes, such as the Wassenaar
Agreement or the UN Arms Register. The rectification of their shortcomings would not
require a great deal of effort. This rectification should be achieved in accord with appro-
priate international or at least regional initiatives and should take into account the devel-
opment of trans-national norms, as is emerging with respect to the demand for human
rights and for the punishment of war criminals.
All in all, the perspectives of alternative options for arms export politics should spread
beyond national borders. In the European context, only initiatives relating to EU issues
have any chance of succeeding and of leading to an efficient control regime for arms ex-
ports. The skeleton agreement of 27th July 2000, in combination with steps designed to
create a European defence and safety identity, show the direction arms export policies
have to take. Despite the guarantees given in the Amsterdam Treaty, national prerogatives
have, in reality, become obsolete. Certainly, the process should be started by altering the
corresponding passages in EU treaties, in order to include arms exports in EU wide poli-
tics. Should this alteration of EU treaties not occur, the present prerogatives should be
reinterpreted. This would open up the possibility of giving the EU Code of Conduct of
1998 a more legally binding character. In this context, attention should, in due course, be
paid to strengthening the European parliament’s function as recipient of information and
as a control authority.
This should also include long over-due efforts to remove the air of mystery and the
odour of corruption surrounding arms export politics. This would be in the interests not
only of the public, who demand explanations, but also of governments, if they do not
want to risk to be dragged once again into the whirlpool of individual criminal acts and
44 Cf. Herbert Wulf, Reform des Sicherheitssektors in Entwicklungsländern. Eine Analyse der internation-
alen Diskussion und Implementierungsmöglichkeiten der Reform mit Empfehlungen für die Technische
Zusammenarbeit, Eschborn (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit/GTZ), 2000.
45 Communication between Dr. Uschi Eid, parliamentary secretary of state in the Ministry for Economical
Cooperation and Development, and the head of the parliamentary Committee on Economical Coop-
eration and Development, 25th January 2001.
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the influence of lobby groups. Further emphasis could also be placed on imposing quick-
acting sanctions on individuals involved in arms export deals and suspected of being in-
volved in corruption. This promises to reduce the obvious negative attendant symptoms
in the political culture of democracies.
In relation to the current problems faced by national and European arms export poli-
tics, these suggestions certainly appear to be optimistic, driven as they are by the vision of
mastering the problems by a radical break with the past. It is already easy to imagine how
difficult the executive and legislative forces of the EU member states will find the task of
realising such a change in responsibilities. However, the pressure brought about by the
europeanisation of the defence industry and by the constraints imposed by reduction and
reformation of the armed forces might be even more effective than the plea of non-
governmental organisations. The former want legal norms to be harmonised and politics
in this field to be made reliable on pragmatic grounds, whereas the latter demand a
change of course for reasons of principle. All in all, the long term success of such efforts
will only occur if it is possible to establish a framework of rules that avoids the short-
comings of the many rules and regulations currently in force, that promises to be more
predictable for the persons involved and that increases the degree of transparency.
Finally, the possibility is pointed out of restricting the transfer of arms and defence
equipment to cases where an existing cooperation in security and defence questions exists
or even to do without them altogether. Germany, like the majority of industrial states,
forms part of international alliances and systems of alliances. Despite all claims to na-
tional sovereignty, these alliances have, meanwhile, taken over a central position in inter-
national and security policies. At the same time, they claim to establish and defend com-
mon guiding values in politics and society. Therefore, the priority of national sovereignty
in decisions about arms export policies appears an anachronism, as the ways of coopera-
tion and integration are increasingly preferred when it comes to the organisation of
armed forces and the production of arms. At the moment, excessive political energy is
used in working on the negative consequences of these discrepancies. It would be more
obvious to transfer arms and defence equipment only to recipients that share norms and
are integrated in security structures that are also valid for the supplier countries. The
control of arms and defence equipment supplied would be maintained in the context of
the alliances. Even in the North Atlantic Alliance, practical politics is far away from such
aims, as the argument concerning the German arms export to Turkey indicates – Turkey
is a state with democratic and legal status of which doubt has been cast time and again.
The suggestions outlined here also include security policies that are not defined from a
military point of view, that lead to a decrease in the demand for arms and defence
equipment and that create a link between arms export policies and global initiatives in
arms export control and disarmament.
In Anglo Saxon discussions in particular, parallels are repeatedly drawn between the
dilemmas of the international arms trade and the campaign that lead to the abolition of
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slavery at the end of the 19th century.46 Allegedly, this campaign suffered from being out
of touch with reality, despite its emotional and rhetorical force. Ultimately, however, the
concerns were spread throughout society and – in connection with certain economic
developments – became acceptable and prevailed. Regarding the ban on wars of aggres-
sion, the community of states reached a point, at the end of the 1920’s, that enabled it to
enter into the Briand-Kellog Pact in 1928.
From a German point of view, in the two decades that followed this pact, the inclina-
tion to pick up the thread of this success story, of a once potent and politically powerful
movement in society, was lost. The reproach that this form of pacifism and blindness to
the evil forces of reality planted the seeds for the later explosion of violence still has some
impact and paralyses thinking about the renunciation of the transfer of arms and defence
equipment. Indeed, this option – the fundamental renunciation of German arms transfers
– was there when Art. 26, Par. 2 of Basic Law was originally discussed in the constitu-
tional assembly in Herrnchiemsee in 1948 and led to the inclusion of this section into the
German Basic Law, which is unique when compared with other constitutions worldwide.
However, this was soon interpreted differently, not in the least due to the simple argu-
ment that it would not be possible to equip the police with revolvers otherwise.47 The idea
that German police would have to do without arms was not taken into account.
Nevertheless, the idea of a limitation, if not complete cessation, of arms exports is fas-
cinating, particularly with respect to the precariousness of current arms export politics
and their frequently fatal results. The most important suppliers of arms are democracies
that provide defence equipment to the rest of the world. Without the supply of weapons
and other defence equipment, the many violent conflicts involving those democracies
might not cease to exist but would decrease in the intensity with which brute force is
used. Thus, the costs of such a sudden change in policy need to be weighed against the
current situation. This comparison might also reveal connections that would cast a differ-
ent light on the pros and cons of arms transfer and might even convince current advo-
cates of arms trade. Democracies that stand up to other countries in the name of peace
increase their international credibility and can only profit from doing so.
46 For example: Antony Sampson, The Arms Bazaar in the Nineties: From Krupp to Saddam, London
(Hodder & Stoughton), 1991; John Mueller, Changing Attitudes to War. The Impact of the First World
War, in: British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 21, No. 1, 1991, pp. 25–50; Williamson, see above
(footnote 40); Craft, see above (footnote 1).
47 Cf. von Poser und Groß Naedlitz, see above (footnote 13), p. 25.
